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Introduction
It is a common phenomenon that members of different groups are simultaneously affected by some economic activity but have opposing preferences concerning its consequences. Climate protection is usually considered to be a global public good whose provision is beneficial for all countries in the world. This conceptualization, however, ignores that global warming − within some limits and apart from catastrophic outcomes producing grave losses for all countries -might be welfare improving for some regions and countries. Countries like Canada or Russia may benefit from a higher temperature, e.g. through reduced heating costs, increased agricultural output and improved prospects for the tourism industry, which implies that climate protection can become a public bad for these countries. Therefore, the effects of climate policy are "contentious" so that a conflict of interest between the beneficiaries and the victims of greenhouse gas abatement arises.
In the field of environmental economics, opposing utility effects are not restricted to climate policy. In general, environmental policies are disadvantageous for agents who do not share "green preferences" underlying these policies but yet have to bear part of their cost. E.g., Bostedt (1999) has observed that, within Sweden, many lovers of nature consider the Swedish wolf as a public good. For reindeer herders in the North it is a public bad instead since the wolf preys on the migrating reindeers.
Contentious public characteristics are also present in a lot of fields outside environmental economics: While charitable giving is regarded as a public good by the altruistic donors, it is rejected by others emphasizing its potentially adverse economic effects. In the context of foreign aid prominent examples for such a critical attitude towards transfers are Collier (2007) and Deaton (2013) , who are afraid of deteriorating performance incentives on the part of the recipients in developing countries, waste of money through bad governance and corruption of the ruling elites. But also arms races between enemy countries (see, e.g., Bruce 1990 , or Ihori, 2000 or lobbyism in support of opposing political goals (see, e.g., Ihori and Kameda, 2015) can be interpreted from the perspective of contentious public characteristics.
In the presence of contentious public characteristics, the beneficiaries and the victims often have the possibility to counteract each other: While the beneficiaries, as "augmenters" of the public characteristic, can increase the level of the public characteristic (and have an incentive to do so), the victims, as "depleters" of the public characteristic, can reduce it through countervailing measures. An example for such opposing activities appears in the context of climate change: While the countries that benefit from a lower global temperature may abate greenhouse gas emissions the countries, which are negatively affected by mitigation measures, might instead purposefully increase greenhouse gas emissions or conduct geo-engineering 2 , e.g., through albedo modification, in order to increase global temperature. Other examples are obviously given by arms races and lobbying activities.
In economic theory, the simultaneous occurrence of public characteristics that are beneficial for some and adverse for others has only been treated in quite specific settings until now (Ihori, 2000, and Kameda, 2015) , i.e. by assuming CobbDouglas preferences for the agents involved. Using the ideas of the Aggregative Game Approach as conceived by Cornes and Hartley (2007) it becomes, however, possible to generalize in a straightforward way some of the already known results and, more importantly, to infer new effects for contentious characteristics, which can be augmented by one group and depleted by another. Such an analysis will be conducted in this paper whose structure will be as follows: After presenting the theoretical setting in Section 2, we describe in Section 3 the non-cooperative Nash equilibria of voluntary provision of the contentious public characteristics. By taking up a central issue in public good theory, the effects of income changes and income redistribution on these Nash equilibria are analyzed in Section 4, which in particular leads to some novel neutrality results to increases of income. Extending some findings of Ihori (2000) and Ihori and Kameda (2015) , preference changes and coalition building then are considered in Section 5. In Section 6, we establish a paradoxical effect caused by improvements of the victims' depleting technology, which results in utility losses for both the augmenters and the depleters. Some of the effects, which arise in case of contentious public characteristics, are illustrated by examples with Cobb-Douglas preferences in Section 7. In Section 8 we describe the Pareto optimal solutions and compare their welfare properties to those of the Nash equilibrium. This also enables us to identify some problems of international cooperation in the presence of contentiousness of public characteristics. Finally, in Section 9 we conclude and hint at some possible extension of the analysis.
The Model Framework
We assume that there are two groups I and J of agents which either benefit or suffer from the aggregate level G of a public characteristics PC.
Group I (of size m ) contains the PC-beneficiaries. Each agent ∈ i I is characterized by its initial endowment ("income")
w and its utility function is ( , )
is defined for all private consumption levels 0 ≥ (ii) 
Effects of Income Redistribution and Income Growth
Starting from an interior NE we consider transfers between two agents, which throughout this section, are kept so small that interiority is preserved. In this way we incorporate public bads in the familiar analysis of effects of income transfers in voluntary public good provision (see Bergstrom, Blume and Varian, 1986, and Sandler, 1996, pp. 163 − 165) .
Proposition 3: (i) An income transfer from an agent ∈ k I to an agent ∈ l J leads to a falling aggregate PC-level in NE. Welfare of all agents in group I decreases and welfare of all agents in group J increases.
(ii) The same effects as in (i) result from a transfer within group I that goes from an agent 1 i with a high augmenting productivity 1 i a to an agent 2 i with a lower productivity 2 i a and from a transfer within group J that goes from an agent 1 j with a low depleting productivity 1 j b to an agent 2 j with a higher productivity 2 j b .
Proof: (i) An income transfer ∆ from an agent ∈ k I to an agent ∈ l J reduces the right hand side of (4) 
then has to fall to some ˆ′ G to restore equilibrium according to condition (4). The monotonicity properties of the expansion paths also imply that private consumption
c as a result of the transfer (see Figure 3 ). The claimed welfare effects thus directly follow from the properties of the utility functions ( , ) (ii) The proof is analogous to that of part (i). QED Proposition 3 (ii) generalizes effects of income redistribution that have been analyzed by Buchholz and Konrad (1995) and Ihori (1996) , where agents for whom PC is a public bad have been absent. Proposition 3, moreover, yields some neutrality results, which are closely related to those established by Warr (1983) and Bergstrom, Blume and Varian (1986) for conventional public good economies.
Proposition 4: An income transfer from an agent
, who has the same productivity, i.e. 
Proof:
The assertion directly follows from condition (4) as such a transfer leaves the right hand side of (4) unchanged. QED However, as a new form of neutrality a "neutral growth property" may occur in the case of contentious public characteristics. This "super neutrality" (Ihori and Kameda, 2015, p. 9 ) is in a broader sense reminiscent of the immiserizing growth phenomenon as observed by Sandler (1989, 1996, pp. 166 − 170) for public good economies, since an improvement of the feasibility constraint does not entail an increase of utilities.
Proposition 5: Assume that income of an agent k I ∈ is increased by 0 I k ∆ ≥ and income of an agent l J ∈ is increased by 0 J l ∆ ≥ . Then the aggregate PC-level rises (remains unchanged, falls), utility of all augmenters ∈ i I rises (remains unchanged, falls) and utility of all depleters ∈ j J falls (remains unchanged, rises) in the NE if
Proof: In the first (second, third) case the right hand side of (4) 
Effects of Preference Changes and Coalition Building
Keeping endowment levels fixed, we now, as a first step in this section, explore the effects that arise when either some agent k I ∈ is substituted by some other agent with higher preferences for the public good, or, alternatively, that some agent l J ∈ is substituted by an agent that suffers less from the public bad and thus has a lower preference for a reduction of the PC. Our analysis in this section will provide some generalization of the results by Ihori (2000) and Ihori and Kameda (2015) , which are restricted to the case of Cobb-Douglas preferences.
As usual, an agent k I ∈ is said to have a higher preference for the PC when his utility function changes from the originally given ( , ) 
Proposition 6: Assume that either the preferences of agent k I ∈ for the PC get stronger or that preferences of an agent l J ∈ for avoiding the PC get weaker. Then PC-supply in the NE becomes higher in both cases. In the first case, utility of all augmenters { } / i I k ∈ rises in the NE while utility of all agents j J ∈ falls. In the second case, utility of all augmenters ∈ i I rises while utility of all agents
Proof: The change of the expansion paths of agent k and agent l , which follows from the assumed preference changes, leads to a new function ( ) G Φ ɶ as defined by (3), for The cooperating group then plays Nash against the still non-cooperating members of the other group. To facilitate the exposition we now assume that both groups are completely homogeneous, i.e. that all augmenters have the same income ∈ and all j J ∈ is assumed for the augmenting and depleting productivities.
3 For an analysis of coalition building in a standard public good economy without depleters see Hattori (2015) and Buchholz and Eichenseer (2017) .
In order to find the new equilibrium, which results after partial cooperation within one of the groups, we first of all examine how optimal reactions change through partial cooperation: Look at group I and assume that the aggregate level of the depleting activities by group J is 
Based on the equilibrium conditions (6) and (7) we obtain the following result on the effects of partial cooperation.
Proposition 7:
Assume that group I and group J both are homogeneous and that an interior equilibrium is attained when one of these groups forms a coalition and cooperatively determines its PC-contribution.
(i) If the augmenter group I cooperates, public good supply is higher and utility of the members of group J is lower in the partial cooperation equilibrium than in the original NE without cooperation. The welfare effect for the cooperating group I is ambiguous.
(ii) If the depleter group J cooperates, public good supply is lower and utility of the members of group I is higher in the partial cooperation equilibrium than in the original NE without cooperation. The welfare effect for the cooperating group is ambiguous.
Proof: (i) Normality and convexity of indifference curves implies that (
ii) The proof is completely analogous to that of part (i). QED
The changes of positions, which result for the members of both groups when group I forms a coalition, are visualized in Figure 4 .
Figure 4
The fact that group I may also lose by forming a coalition is confirmed through an example with Cobb-Douglas preferences in Section 7. There, we will also consider the case in which not only one group but both groups I and J cooperate, and show that the outcome in this case may be Pareto-inferior to the original NE without cooperation.
A Technology Paradox
In this section we show that it is possible that the invention and application of a depleting technology by the members of group J , which can be used to reduce the PClevel and its harmful effects, does not necessarily benefit group J and may, in the end, make both groups worse off 4 . Differentiating (8) In the case 0 b = the income increase thus makes an agent ∈ j J better off if
(v) Let ( ) 1 n m ≥ ⌢ be the largest cardinal number, which satisfies condition (11) and which exists as the right-hand side of (11) exceeds one. From continuity of all functions involved, it follows that for any group size ( ) ≤ ⌢ n n m the members of group J will benefit also from a non-marginal increase of income that leads to income levels ⌢ I w and 
Coalition Building
In this sub-section we start by determining the equilibrium outcome, which results when the augmenter group I builds a coalition that cooperatively determines its PCcontribution whereas the agents in the depleter group J still act non-cooperatively.
According to condition (6) public good supply ˆP I G in the NE with such unilateral cooperation is for any size 2 m ≥ of the cooperating augmenter group I given by (15) 
For a comparison of the utility levels, which a member of group I attains in the original NE and the partial cooperation equilibrium, we note that
The expression on the left-hand side of the second inequality in (18) is falling in n and thus − for all 2 m ≥ and 1 n m ≥ − as the condition for interiority − cannot exceed The case that the depleter group J forms a coalition while the members of group I act non-cooperatively can be treated in an analogous way, whose treatment will therefore be omitted here. Instead, we will consider the case, in which cooperation takes place within both groups. PC-supply ˆT S G in an interior NE with cooperation in both groups then is characterized by the condition In particular, it therefore becomes possible that the members of group J are better off in the NE than in any Pareto optimal solution.
For a further exploration of this issue we again assume that both groups I and J are homogeneous w.r.t. income and preferences and that 1 = = The intuition behind Proposition 10 (i) is that the augmenting agents benefit from the transition from NE to SPA because they cooperatively provide PC and depleting measures by group J are absent. The depleting agents, however, lose by the transition from NE to SPA when either − due to a large size of group I − their additional harm through an increased PC-level is large or when − due to low incomes and small depleting activities − their gain from saving depleting expenses is rather low.
A practical consequence of Proposition 10 is that there may be a conflict between efficiency and distribution, which hampers cooperation on PC-supply. Since − given the conditions in Proposition 10 − the SPA would harm group J as compared to the NE, the members of this group J are not willing to approve an agreement leading to SPA. This impasse may be avoided and a SPA may be made acceptable also for the depleter group J if income is redistributed from group I to group J . In this way, on the one hand, private consumption of the agents ∈ j J is increased and, on the other hand, the harm inflicted on group J is reduced since normality of the public good for the members of group I implies that they will provide less of the PC in their Lindahl equilibrium when their income falls.
Conclusion
At the methodological level, we have demonstrated how the standard tools of public good theory can also be used to include public bads in the analysis and to determine equilibrium solutions in this more general framework. Concerning substance, we have shown that in the case of contentious public characteristics the traditional redistribution neutrality of voluntary public good provision is accompanied by growth neutrality as a new form of neutrality implied by income changes. Moreover, a specific technology paradox arises as an improvement of the depletion technology in the group of victims may make all agents worse off in the Nash equilibrium. Pareto optimality requires the non-application of any defensive activity but without some redistribution of income such a Pareto optimal solution might not be acceptable for the members of the depleter group.
Extensions of the analysis could be made by conducting additional comparative statics w.r.t. productivity parameters and group sizes. We could also consider preferences for which the public characteristic is a public good for an agent up to a certain provision level but then turns into a public bad. In this case interesting situations may occur when, due to some parameter changes, agents may switch from the beneficiary group to the victim group and vice versa. These issues will be topics of future research.
